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Adaptations of Avian Flu Virus Are a Cause for Concern
Abstract
We are in the midst of a revolutionary period in the life sciences. Technological capabilities have dramatically
expanded, we have a much improved understanding of the complex biology of selected microorganisms, and
we have a much improved ability to manipulate microbial genomes. With this has come unprecedented
potential for better control of infectious diseases and significant societal benefit. However, there is also a
growing risk that the same science will be deliberately misused and that the consequences could be
catastrophic. Efforts to describe or define life-sciences research of particular concern have focused on the
possibility that knowledge or products derived from such research, or new technologies, could be directly
misapplied with a sufficiently broad scope to affect national or global security. Research that might greatly
enhance the harm caused by microbial pathogens has been of special concern (1–3). Until now, these efforts
have suffered from a lack of specificity and a paucity of concrete examples of “dual use research of concern”
(3). Dual use is defined as research that could be used for good or bad purposes. We are now confronted by a
potent, real-world example.
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W 
e are in the midst of a revolutionary 
period in the life sciences. Techno-
logical capabilities have dramati-
cally expanded, we have a much improved 
understanding of the complex biology of 
selected microorganisms, and we have a 
much improved ability to manipulate micro-
bial genomes. With this has come unprec-
edented potential for better control of infec-
tious diseases and signiﬁ cant societal beneﬁ t. 
However, there is also a growing risk that the 
same science will be deliberately misused and 
that the consequences could be catastrophic. 
Efforts to describe or define life-sciences 
research of particular concern have focused 
on the possibility that knowledge or products 
derived from such research, or new technolo-
gies, could be directly misapplied with a sufﬁ -
ciently broad scope to affect national or global 
security. Research that might greatly enhance 
the harm caused by microbial pathogens has 
been of special concern ( 1– 3). Until now, 
these efforts have suffered from a lack of spec-
iﬁ city and a paucity of concrete examples of 
“dual use research of concern” ( 3). Dual use 
is deﬁ ned as research that could be used for 
good or bad purposes. We are now confronted 
by a potent, real-world example.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/
H5N1 infection of humans has been a seri-
ous public health concern since its identiﬁ ca-
tion in 1997 in Asia. This virus rarely infects 
humans, but when it does, it causes severe 
disease with case fatality rates of 59% ( 4). To 
date, the transmission of inﬂ uenza A/H5N1 
virus from human to human has been rare, 
and no human pandemic has occurred. If 
inﬂ uenza A/H5N1 virus acquired the capac-
ity for human-to-human spread and retained 
its current virulence, we could face an epi-
demic of substantial proportions. Histori-
cally, epidemics or pandemics with high mor-
talities have been documented when humans 
interact with new agents for which they have 
no immunity, such as with Yersinia pestis 
(plague) in the Middle Ages and the introduc-
tion of smallpox and measles into the Ameri-
cas after the arrival of Europeans.
Recently, several scientif ic research 
teams have achieved some success in isolat-
ing inﬂ uenza A/H5N1 viruses that are trans-
mitted efﬁ ciently between mammals, in one 
instance with maintenance of high patho-
genicity. This information is very impor-
tant because, before these experiments were 
done, it was uncertain whether avian inﬂ u-
enza A/H5N1 could ever acquire the capacity 
for mammal-to-mammal transmission. Now 
that this information is known, society can 
take steps globally to prepare for when nature 
might generate such a virus spontaneously. 
At the same time, these scientiﬁ c results also 
represent a grave concern for global biosecu-
rity, biosafety, and public health. Could this 
knowledge, in the hands of malevolent indi-
viduals, organizations, or governments, allow 
construction of a genetically altered inﬂ uenza 
virus capable of causing a pandemic with 
mortality exceeding that of the “Spanish ﬂ u” 
epidemic of 1918? The research teams that 
performed this work did so in a well-intended 
effort to discover evolutionary routes by 
which avian inﬂ uenza A/H5N1 viruses might 
adapt to humans. Such knowledge may be 
valuable for improving the public health 
response to a looming natural threat. And, 
to their credit and that of the peer reviewers 
selected by the journals Science and Nature, 
the journals themselves, as well as the U.S. 
government, it was recognized before their 
publication that these experiments had dual 
use of concern potential.
The U.S. government asked the National 
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity 
(NSABB) ( 5), to assess the dual-use research 
implications of two as-yet-unpublished man-
uscripts on the avian inﬂ uenza A/H5N1 virus, 
to consider the risks and beneﬁ ts of commu-
nicating the research results, and to provide 
ﬁ ndings and recommendations regarding the 
responsible communication of this research.
Risk assessment of public harm is chal-
lenging because it necessitates consider-
ation of the intent and capability of those who 
wish to do harm, as well as the vulnerability 
of the public and the status of public health 
preparedness for both deliberate and acci-
dental events. We found the potential risk of 
public harm to be of unusually high magni-
tude. In formulating our recommendations to 
the government, scientiﬁ c journals, and the 
broader scientiﬁ c community, we tried to bal-
ance the great risks against the beneﬁ ts that 
could come from making the details of this 
research known. Because the NSABB found 
that there was signiﬁ cant potential for harm 
in fully publishing these results and that the 
harm exceeded the beneﬁ ts of publication, we 
therefore recommended that the work not be 
fully communicated in an open forum. The 
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 “Communication … should be greatly limited in terms of the 
experimental details and results.”
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NSABB was unanimous that communica-
tion of the results in the two manuscripts it 
reviewed should be greatly limited in terms of 
the experimental details and results.
This is an unprecedented recommenda-
tion for work in the life sciences, and our 
analysis was conducted with careful consid-
eration both of the potential beneﬁ ts of pub-
lication and of the potential harm that could 
occur from such a precedent. Our concern is 
that publishing these experiments in detail 
would provide information to some person, 
organization, or government that would help 
them to develop similar mammal-adapted 
inﬂ uenza A/H5N1 viruses for harmful pur-
poses. We believe that as scientists and as 
members of the general public, we have a pri-
mary responsibility “to do no harm” as well 
as to act prudently and with some humility 
as we consider the immense power of the 
life sciences to create microbes with novel 
and unusually consequential properties. At 
the same time, we acknowledge that there 
are clear beneﬁ ts to be realized for the pub-
lic good in alerting humanity of this potential 
threat and in pursuing those aspects of this 
work that will allow greater preparedness and 
the potential development of novel strategies 
leading to future disease control. By recom-
mending that the basic result be communi-
cated without methods or details, we believe 
that the benefits to society are maximized 
and the risks minimized. Although scientists 
pride themselves on the creation of scientiﬁ c 
literature that deﬁ nes careful methodology 
that would allow other scientists to replicate 
experiments, we do not believe that wide-
spread dissemination of the methodology in 
this case is a responsible action.
The life sciences have reached a cross-
roads. The direction we choose and the pro-
cess by which we arrive at this decision must 
be undertaken as a community and not rele-
gated to small segments of government, the 
scientiﬁ c community, or society. Physicists 
faced a similar situation in the 1940s with 
nuclear weapons research, and it is inevitable 
that other scientiﬁ c disciplines will also do so.
Along with our recommendation to restrict 
communication of these particular scientiﬁ c 
results, we discussed the need for a rapid and 
broad international discussion of dual-use 
research policy concerning inﬂ uenza A/H5N1 
virus with the goal of developing a consensus 
on the path forward. There is no doubt that 
this is a complex endeavor that will require 
diligent and nuanced consideration. There are 
many important stakeholders whose opinions 
need to be heard at this juncture. This must be 
done quickly and with the full participation of 
multiple societal components.
We are aware that the continuing circula-
tion of the highly pathogenic avian inﬂ uenza 
A/H5N1 virus in Eurasia—where it is con-
stantly found to cause disease in animals of 
particular regions—constitutes a continu-
ing threat to humankind. A pandemic, or the 
deliberate release of a transmissible highly 
pathogenic inﬂ uenza A/H5N1 virus, would 
be an unimaginable catastrophe for which the 
world is currently inadequately prepared. It is 
urgent to establish how best to facilitate the 
much-needed research, as well as minimize 
potential dual use.
To facilitate and motivate this process, we 
also discussed the possibility of the scientiﬁ c 
community participating in a self-imposed 
moratorium on the broad communication of 
the results of experiments that show greatly 
enhanced virulence or transmissibility of 
such potentially dangerous microbes as the 
inﬂ uenza A/H5N1 virus, until consensus is 
reached on the balance that must be struck 
between academic freedom and protecting 
the greater good of humankind from poten-
tial danger. With proper diligence and rapid 
achievement of a consensus on a proper path 
forward, this could have little detrimental 
effect on scientiﬁ c progress but signiﬁ cant 
effect on diminishing risk.
There are many parallels with the situa-
tion in the 1970s and recombinant DNA tech-
nologies ( 6– 8). The Asilomar Conference in 
California in 1975 was a landmark meeting 
important to the identiﬁ cation, evaluation, 
and mitigation of risks posed by recombinant 
DNA technologies. In that case, the research 
community voluntarily imposed a temporary 
moratorium on the conduct of recombinant 
DNA research until they could develop guid-
ance for the safe and responsible conduct of 
such research. We believe that this is another 
Asilomar-type moment for public health 
and infectious-disease research that urgently 
needs our attention.
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